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Prosperous regions are educated regions. Ohio’s relatively low 
share of residents with college degrees has concerned one 
governor after the other and proposals for managing our 
university system have differed substantially. The Kasich 
administration’s higher education proposal, the Enterprise 
University Plan for Ohio, is likely to form the basis for 
education proposals going forward.1 The proposal advocates 
for the creation of “enterprise universities” that receive, among 
other things: 
• Broad exemption from state fiscal and administrative 
statutes; 
• Diminished state oversight of real estate, construction, 
procurement, and legal settlements; 
• Elimination of student enrollment caps; 
• Authority to set differential tuition. 
 
This proposal, like similar models in other states, is based on 
the idea that (1) cost savings ensue from deregulation of 
university management, (2) university administrators respond 
to these hypothetical savings by committing to expanding 
college enrollment and graduation, tuition affordability, and 
closing higher education gaps, and (3) such commitments can reverse or alter decades of 
performance. This paper examines different educational management models to assess the validity of 
those assumptions. 
 
We want to make clear at the outset that the most important factor in access, enrollment, completion, 
tuition cost and affordability for low and moderate-income students is not management structure. On 
the contrary, the way to increase enrollment and completion, particularly for those from modest 
backgrounds, is to provide high levels of funding to higher education and target it to need-based aid. 
However, because deregulation has been presented as a model for Ohio, this paper examines how 
deregulation has correlated with access, achievement and affordability in other states. 
 
Our analysis suggests that deregulation does not increase college completion, make college 
affordable, or close the higher education gap. In many cases, deregulated states seem to perform 
worse than the nation on many indicators of accessible and affordable higher education. 
                                                
1 Chancellor Jim Petro, “An Enterprise University Plan for Ohio,” The Ohio Board of Regents at http://bit.ly/WdzLFQ.  
   Key findings 
 
• A stronger higher education 
system has been crucial to 
Ohio’s development. 
 
• Leaders have proposed 
deregulating Ohio universities 
and reducing state control. 
 
• Reducing state control over 
higher education has not 
improved outcomes in other 
states. 
 
• Inflation-adjusted tuition 
increased by 89 percent at 
flagship schools over ten years 
in the most deregulated states. 
 
• To increase access and 
completion, and control tuition, 
Ohio must commit to adequate 
funding. 
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This paper refocuses attention on the importance of supporting Ohio students. States may appreciate 
deregulated higher education because, like other forms of privatization, it reduces support, 
responsibility and oversight. University administrations may see opportunities to raise revenues 
through real estate deals, parking arrangements, subcontracting, reducing staff compensation, and 
changing other employment relationships. Private contractors and the business community may favor 
these arrangements because there are lucrative possibilities for contracts, real estate deals and other 
arrangements. But the point of the system is not to serve the needs of legislators, administrators or 
contractors – it is to educate students. Students, families, employers and taxpayers need a vibrant 
higher education system capable of delivering affordable academic programs that connect to the 21st 
century economy.  
 
The higher education challenge 
Public universities and colleges in Ohio helped to dramatically increase higher education levels over 
the twentieth century. They have given Ohio employers skilled professionals, provided a pathway to 
the middle class for Ohio students, and provided Ohio businesses with cutting-edge research. They 
are a crucial public institution that has greatly enriched the state and will only increase in importance 
in the coming decades. With economic change, employers, individuals, and state governments 
increasingly look to colleges and universities to create a pathway from high school to work across 
many occupations and fields.2 Ohio and the United States more generally have seen stark drops in job 
quality and job availability for students with just a high school degree. Such shifts have meant that 
higher education is becoming a prerequisite for even a modest middle class occupation.  
 
However, Ohio’s universities face substantial challenges:   
 
• Our higher education attainment rate is low.  In 2010, just 26.7 percent of Ohio adults had at 
least a bachelor’s degree, compared to 29.9 percent of in the United States, ranking us 34th among 
states.3 Demand for higher education is growing: 32 percent more students enrolled in Ohio’s 
public colleges and universities in 2010 than in 1990. Unfortunately, this growth was lower than 
the nation as a whole, where enrollments grew by 52 percent in the same period.4 A growing 
percentage of jobs with middle-class compensation require some college.5 By 2018, the Board of 
Regents argues that 57 percent of Ohio jobs will require a college degree or coursework.6 
Expanding higher education attainment requires attracting new student populations, especially 
those that have been under-represented in higher education traditionally. Chancellor Jim Petro, 
like Chancellor Eric Fingerhut before him, sets growth in college graduation rates as a top priority 
for Ohio, and the planning document, The Fourth Report on the Condition of Higher Education, 
identified students from moderate- and low-income backgrounds as a priority.7  
 
• The state continues to slash fiscal support for higher education and need-based financial 
aid. Growing demand for higher education coincides with sharp declines in state support for 
public colleges and universities, across the nation and in Ohio. In 1991, Ohio dedicated $7.03 of 
                                                
2 The Ohio Department of Job and Family Services projects growth through 2018 to be fastest in jobs requiring 
postsecondary training. See ODJFS, 2018 Ohio Job Outlook Employment Projections, 2008.  
3 National Center for Higher Education Management Systems Information Center at http://bit.ly/TukWau.  
4 Footnotes based on Southern Regional Education Board, Table 35: Enrollment in 4-year colleges and universities 
5  Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, 2018 Ohio Job Outlook, Employment Projections, 2008. 
6 Ohio Board of Regents, Fourth Report on the Condition of Higher Education in Ohio, 2011. 
7 Ibid. 
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every $1,000 in state personal income to higher education. This plunged to $6.30 in 2000 and to 
$4.57 in 2011, a 35 percent decline over 20 years, which surpassed the 31 percent decline seen in 
the nation in the same period.8  Further, the dollar amount of need-based financial aid has plunged 
to its 1993 level in Ohio, not adjusted for inflation, even as tuition has risen sharply.9 In Ohio, 
state need-based grant awards to students eligible for Pell grants dropped from about a quarter of 
the federal award in 1990 to about six percent in 2010, much lower than the national average.10 
Ohio’s de-funding of need-based aid has been extreme and at odds with a policy goal of 
encouraging higher education. 
 
• Tuition is high. Public colleges and universities have responded to sharp reductions in state 
allocations by increasing tuition and fees. Ohio’s public four-year institutions are the third most 
expensive in the nation relative to family income; our public two-years are the fifth most 
expensive. At $8,387 in 2010, Ohio’s in-state students pay $2,130 more than the average college 
student in the nation, while Ohio students at two-year colleges pay $411 more.11 
 
• There is an education gap.  An Ohio wishing to boost post-secondary attainment cannot 
discourage low and moderate-income students, from pursuing college. Higher education is not 
equally distributed. Students from poor and middle-class families are much less likely to finish 
higher education of any kind, as Figure 1 shows – nearly 8 of 10 students from families in the top 
fourth (earning above about $100,000 a year) finish college, while just a third of upper-middle 
income students and fewer than one in six lower-middle and poor students complete their 
bachelor’s degree. Disinvestment disproportionately hurts students who aren’t wealthy.  
  
                                                
8  National Center for Higher Education Management Systems Information Center (NCHEMS), State and Local Support 
for Higher Education Operating Expenses Per $1,000 of Personal Income, 1991 and 2011, retrieved: http://bit.ly/Wklghc. 
9 Funding for need-based aid in Ohio fell sharply to $76.3 million in 2009-10, from $224.9 million in 2008-09. The 2009 
level was less than we provided nearly 20 years ago in 1993 ($77.9 million). See Southern Regional Education Board, 
Table 67, State Scholarships, Grants, and Other Financial Aid Funds, Undergraduate Grant Aid, Need-Based, in Millions. 
10 Post Secondary Education Opportunity, State Need Based Aid – Ohio databook and national spreadsheet, at 
http://www.postsecondary.org/default.asp.   
11 See Table 1, herein. 
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Figure 1 
Middle- and low-income students less likely to complete college 
Bachelor degree attainment by young adults by family income quartile, US, 2010 
 
Source:  Policy Matters Ohio, based on Postsecondary Education Opportunity, “Family Income and Educational Attainment, 1970 to 
2010,” Newsletter #235, January 2012 at http://www.postsecondary.org/last12/235_112pg1_16.pdf  
 
Trends in control of higher education in Ohio 
The basic architecture of modern higher education systems developed in the 1950s and 1960s, when 
states began forming and instituting one of two governance structures: governing boards or state 
coordinating boards.12 Governor James A. Rhodes established the Ohio Board of Regents as a state 
coordinating board in 1963 with the mission of devising a master plan for higher education. In 
practice, Ohio’s public universities, with their own boards of trustees answering to a Board of 
Regents outside of the Governor’s cabinet, maintained a relatively high degree of independence,13 
affected over time by legislation imposing tuition caps, enrollment caps, state oversight of student 
housing, two-year campus service districts, and new processes to oversee creation of academic 
programs.14  Under Governor Ted Strickland, the Chancellor of Education was brought into the 
Governor’s cabinet for the first time, and higher education was formally assembled into the 
University System of Ohio to coordinate programs and foster transferability of credits among 
member institutions.  
 
The Enterprise University Plan departed from the centralization strategy of the prior administration 
and proposed to substantially reduce public control over the university system. This approach, first 
promoted in the late 1980s by conservative think tanks like the Pioneer Foundation, advocated for 
deregulation, decentralization, and privatization of management and funding. The plan proposed 
exemptions from some statutory controls for all 14 public universities, as well as a tiered approach 
allowing for differing levels of university control in a variety of areas. In comparison to plans in other 
states, this approach would have dramatically reduced public control over and regulation of the 
                                                
12 State governing boards maintain greater control of institutions, while state coordinating boards focus on ensuring 
efficiencies in planning, budgeting, and academic programs. See Paul Lingenfelter, “Responsibilities of Governing 
Bodies in the United States of America,” Delivered to Seminar on Governing Bodies of Higher Education Institutions: 
Roles and Responsibilities, OECD, Paris, France, August 2006. 
13 John Marcus, “Ohio’s Brain Drain, Reform to Public Higher Education is Intended to Change Perceptions and Retain 
Graduates,” National CrossTalk, May 2010. 
14 Ohio Board of Regents, “The Case for Further Deregulation of Higher Education in Ohio,” July 6, 2001. 
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university system. It would have explicitly reduced the state’s financial obligation while relaxing 
oversight of assets, governance, finance, and legal conventions. Its key provisions included: 
 
1. New conditions for independent boards of trustees - Governance standards were relaxed: 
Boards of trustees could alter meeting procedures and rules; state administrative procedures 
code would be reviewed for changes as pertains to universities. 
2. Review of “antiquated statutes”– This category encompassed such changes as: 
• Universities would be allowed to set differential tuition based on academic program, 
facility and space concerns.  
• Enrollment caps would be removed. 
• At present the state Attorney General’s Office oversees legal matters of over $100,000; 
Universities would be allowed to handle matters of up to $300,000, depending on tier.  
• Universities and hospitals would be allowed to self-insure.  
3. Expanded university authority over construction, procurement, and real estate 
development and finance. 
• Universities could issue their own bonds without oversight from the state at the highest 
tier of independence;  
• Fees could be set and pledged to back debt service without permission from the state;  
• Real estate could be bought and sold with limited or no oversight from the state, 
depending on level of independence.  
• Competitive bid limits would rise from $49,000 to up to $1,000,000, depending on tier. 
 
In exchange for this new authority, Ohio’s public colleges and universities would accept less in 
allocations and be required to invest a portion of State Share of Investment – the funding that 
supports classroom teaching – into merit-based aid programs to be developed by the Ohio Board of 
Regents. Reinvestment into merit-based programs was the primary required action specified in the 
plan; there was no mention of additional performance targets. The plan spoke to the importance of 
affordability and completion on the first page, yet proposed no need-based aid. Restraint or reduction 
in tuition was one of nine factors – seven of which must be fulfilled – considered if a university was 
to be awarded the highest level of independence under the Enterprise University Plan. This is the 
only specific detail about affordability provided. Two benchmarks addressed completion; one 
addressed articulation with community colleges.15 
 
A central question in evaluating changes to higher education is whether the approach boosts or 
diminishes higher education opportunities, especially for students of modest means. Since the 1990s, 
several states have experimented with aspects of the approach, allowing us to examine how well 
similar models in other states have helped resolve the sorts of challenges facing Ohio.  
 
Trends in higher education control  
States have multiple ways of responding to financial constraints and growing demand for higher 
education. As mentioned earlier, the management model is not the key variable in whether college is 
affordable or in whether students from modest backgrounds attend and finish. The following section 
                                                
15 The Chancellor’s recent “Complete College Ohio” proposal (http://bit.ly/RAMI96) also makes two mentions of need-
based aid: Once in connection with the merit-based scholarship program and once in connection with controlling tuition.  
By contrast, the College Board, which is leading a national initiative on college completion, has 12 recommended state 
policies in support of affordability. See http://completionagenda.collegeboard.org/recommendations/8?quicktabs_1=2. 
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focuses on deregulation because the administration presented it as a solution here and because some 
premises of the Enterprise Plan are likely to undergird proposals in Ohio’s pending state budget.   
 
At heart, the approach is structural in nature, based on the belief that changing the structure of higher 
education can change outcomes. Deregulated higher education policies alter the governance 
structures of higher education, state coordinating boards or governing boards, by re-balancing notions 
of public and university control and changing the degree of coordination and interconnection across 
institutions. Many states have moved toward semi-private, deregulated public higher education 
models in the past 20 years, several in very recent years. Each state conceives of restructuring in 
unique ways and in 2004, the American Council of Education (ACE) described six types of policy 
designs that reduce public control over higher education management: 1) decentralization; 2) 
statewide compacts; 3) public ‘corporations;’ 4) charters/performance contracts; 5) vouchers; and 6) 
tuition deregulation.16 These types, with the ACE’s original examples from 2004 as well as our 
selected updates or additions, are described in Figure 2.17  
 
The higher education changes described in Figure 2 began in the mid-1990s, when states like New 
Jersey and Connecticut began reducing public control over matters like internal governance, hiring 
and promotion, academic programs, tuition revenue, some aspects of spending, and some competitive 
bidding. Sometimes reduced public control was structured as a pilot program or made part of time-
limited project management.18 Recognizing the experimental nature of such policies, some states 
proceeded with caution and restraint as they deregulated public higher education.  
 
Caution began to give way by the end of the decade, when certain states began exploring new 
exemptions from statutory regulations and administrative controls. In Maryland, for instance, the 
state made the whole university system a public corporation in 1999. With that, the university was re-
designated as a corporation under Maryland law with full liability, operating largely outside state 
procurement and personnel procedures. After 2000, other states built on the decentralization model 
associated with New Jersey by lessening the statewide coordination of public colleges and 
universities and reducing public control.  
  
                                                
16  American Council on Education, “Shifting Ground: Autonomy, Accountability, and Privatization in Public Higher 
Education, May 2004. 
17  We selected and expanded on the ACE’s original case selection to better reflect changes since 2004. While dramatic at 
the time, some of the examples highlighted in the 2004 report appear out of date or relatively minor since more recent 
policy developments. 
18  In Virginia, for instance, the state arranged pilot programs handing over some public control over capital spending and 
purchasing. These changes were made permanent at the Medical Center. See Lara Couturier, “Checks and Balances at 
Work: The Restructuring of Virginia’s Higher Education System,” The National Center for Public Policy and Higher 
Education, June 2006. 
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Figure 2 
University management models 
State Enacted Features 
Decentralized 
NJ 1994 Reduced public control over tuition/fees, academic programs, hiring/ compensation for certain employees, investments 
CT 1991 1995 
Block grant appropriations reduced public control over spending, hiring and property 
management, and relaxed competitive bidding on purchases.  In 1995, the flagship was 
handed control of a large-scale, $1 billion capital project including project management, 
timing, cost revisions, construction standards, real estate alterations or demolition, and 
exemption from zoning laws/ environmental impacts. 
VA 2005 
Reduced public control over: material disposal, leases, procurement, construction projects, 
real estate sales under $5 million. Exempted from state Personnel Act (limited to 
administrative and faculty hires), procurement reporting, information technology review. 
Performance targets on affordability, access, retention, and economic development, 
including under-developed areas of the state. 
Public corporations 
MD 1999 
University System was made public corporation and was given more control over 
operations and legal liability. State Finance and Procurement Act no longer applied to 
university with certain limits. Exempt from State Personnel System but bound to collective 
bargaining. Can enter into contracts, incur liabilities, borrow, trade stocks, and issue bonds. 
Real estate sales and leasing made subject to Public Works approval. Performance targets 
on access and retention. 
 OR  2011 
University system made a public corporation and given more control over operations. 
University system given fee remission powers on privately-raised funds, retention of 
interest earnings, risk management autonomy, more control over group health and welfare 
insurance. Higher Education Board sets tuition and can approve privately funded property 
purchases or construction without other oversight. 
Tuition deregulation 
TX 2003 Eliminated public control of tuition, allowed universities to have price lock-ins, pricing by academic degree, and off-peak discounts. 
Vouchers 
CO 2004 
University System made an ‘enterprise institution’ exempt from spending limits under the 
Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR). State appropriations to higher education were replaced 
by tuition vouchers and performance contracts for post-baccalaureate studies. 
Performance targets on retention, graduation, and underrepresented student access. 
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State Enacted Features 
College charters or performance contracts  Features 
MD, 
FL, 
MA, 
CO 
1992, 
2001, 
2004, 
2004 
Chartered single colleges as public honors or specialty colleges separate from wider 
university systems. The college receives a lump sum block grant in exchange for 
separation from the rest of the postsecondary education system. The colleges are St. 
Mary’s in Maryland, New College of Florida, Mass. Institute of Art and Design, Colorado 
School of Mines. Each institution has fewer than 3,000 students enrolled. 
Statewide compacts 
KY 1997 
Defined statewide goals for higher education by statute, as well as created a system for 
statewide coordination of higher education. Established 5 funds to channel allocations. 
Removed community colleges from University of Kentucky management. Required 25% 
of student financial aid to be set-aside for low-income students.  
MN 1995 
Defined statewide goals for higher education by statute and shored up statewide 
coordination by consolidating 3 postsecondary education systems into one, with the 
purpose of widening course offerings, easing degree transfer across institutions, 
coordinating financial aid. Eliminated some administrative positions and courses. 
 
Ohio’s proposal was inspired by the examples of Virginia and Colorado, as the Enterprise University 
Plan makes clear, and most closely resembles the Virginia model. 19 Virginia aggressively moved its 
university system toward a deregulated model when it passed the “Restructured Higher Education 
Financial and Administration Operations Act” in 2005.20 The legislative change was prompted by the 
state’s major research universities (University of Virginia, College of William and Mary, and 
Virginia Polytechnical and State University) seeking independence through a charter that would 
designate them as “political subdivisions of the state.”21 Governor Mark Warren rejected this request, 
thereby maintaining the research universities as proper state agencies.22 In exchange, he developed a 
tiered system that increased independence and reduced public control of all of the state’s public 
colleges and universities (including two-year colleges).23 
 
                                                
19 The bulk of the Enterprise University Plan involves documentation of precedents for the reduction of state control over 
public university systems. Most states are listed alphabetically, except for Virginia and Colorado that are set aside as 
exemplars of the sort of policy changes proposed in the plan. 
20  Colorado is considered aggressive in this area as a result of its establishment of the Colorado Opportunity Fund in 
2004, a tuition voucher system that replaced state appropriations to public universities with direct aid to undergraduate 
students. While this did exempt Colorado’s public universities from the rigidities written into the state’s Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights, it did not significantly alter university’s administrative or fiscal powers. This came later, in 2010. 
21  This is a designation usually reserved for counties and towns. See Couturier, p. 8. 
22  “True” charter universities established as separate, stand-alone institutions are rare and typically small honors colleges, 
specialty colleges, or university divisions. For instance, the New College of Florida, which started as a private institution 
taken over by the state in the mid-1970s to resolve a fiscal crisis, is today an autonomous honors college with fewer than 
1,000 students. 
23 The highest-tier institutions are inclusive of the state’s major research universities and are considered “covered 
institutions” with university administrators granted more extensive control over a broader range of fiscal and 
administrative procedures than universities at lower tiers. The 2005 Act also reaffirms that tuition price-setting powers are 
held by universities. All universities in Virginia had control over their tuition levels prior to the Act; however there had 
been a history of the state overriding it. See Lara Couturier, “Checks and Balances at Work: The Restructuring of 
Virginia’s Higher Education System,” The National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education, June 2006, p. 2. 
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Ohio’s Enterprise University Plan shares many features with Virginia’s 2005 Restructuring Act.24 
Among other similarities, the Virginia model hands over to universities control of real estate 
purchasing under $5 million, heightens university authority over tuition rates, and exempts 
universities from state rules around procurement, construction, and personnel. However, state 
controls and state-mandated performance targeting are important components of Virginia’s 2005 Act 
– as they were in virtually all other state attempts at higher education restructuring in the 2000s. 
Performance targets (sometimes tied to funding)25 set institutional or university system goals related 
to student retention and graduation, academic quality, research, affordability, and sometimes 
economic development.26 States include these performance targets as part of higher education 
restructuring with the understanding that reductions in public control may result in university 
decisions out of step with state policy goals. Controls and performance targets are key policy 
instruments for promoting institutional accountability in exchange for administrative and/or fiscal 
flexibility. Existing examples of performance control mechanisms include: 
• Pilot programs: Connecticut and Virginia established new programs, but on a time-limited, 
‘pilot’ basis that allowed for discontinuation. UCONN 2000, for instance, gave the University 
of Connecticut free rein over capital project management but restricted such freedom to ten 
years and $1 billion, with extensions needing to be reauthorized. University of Virginia 
effectively made its top tier, Level III designation a “pilot program” rather than a permanent 
feature of university restructuring.27 
• Renewal periods: Virginia limits agreements with “covered institutions” to three years 
initially and five years subsequently.  
• Labor protections: Maryland sought to protect the workforce through collective bargaining 
statutes pertaining to the new public corporations. Virginia also mandated that universities 
solicit employee input as part of its offer of state deregulation. 
• Performance contracts and expectations: Colorado, Maryland, and Virginia make 
affordability and under-represented student access, retention, and achievement explicit 
commitments for universities. Maryland sets African Americans as a specific target 
population. Colorado and Virginia identify low-income students as priorities. Virginia also 
                                                
24 Where Ohio departs from the Virginia is at the point of the “charter.” The governor in Virginia refused to re-designate 
its universities as “charters” on the grounds that losing universities as state agencies was undesirable. While the 
Enterprise University Plan fails to mention whether a legal re-designation is part of the establishment of “enterprise 
universities,” the language used throughout the plan certainly raises that possibility; enterprise universities are described 
as “enterprises” of the state, while the University System of Ohio is currently part of an agency of the state. 
25 So-called performance funding is a growing trend even in states not making other large changes. A report by Thomas 
Harnisch identified 14 states with some form of performance-based funding, including Ohio. See Thomas Harnisch, 
“Performance-Based Funding: A Reemerging Strategy in Public Higher Education Financing,” American Association of 
Colleges and Universities, A Higher Education Policy Brief, June 2011. 
26  Maryland, Colorado, and Virginia also include performance targets intended to improve retention and graduation of 
under-represented and/or “at risk” students. Virginia, in addition to performance targets promoting low-income student 
achievement, also requires universities at the highest tier of university-level control to spearhead economic programs in 
economically-distressed area of the state. See Couturier, p. 37. 
27  Lara Couturier described Level III university control in Virginia’s “Restructured Higher Education Financial and 
Administration Operations Act” as providing the “potential” for authority in fiscal and administrative practice since the 
Act offers “decentralization pilot programs in finance and capital outlay.” See Lara Couturier, p. 30. The decision to treat 
Level III university control as a pilot program reflects Virginia lawmakers’ understanding that permanent change should 
only come after an opportunity to assess the implications of policy change.  
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requires highest-tier universities to spearhead economic development programs in 
economically distressed areas of the state.28 
 
In summary, states that have reduced public control to universities or university systems have often 
considered or implemented requirements around affordability and accessibility. These elements were 
absent from the Enterprise University Plan in Ohio. Requirements of this sort are essential to any 
management structure but are particularly crucial in the less accountable, deregulated approaches.  
 
Outcomes of higher education models 
Higher education outcomes depend on many factors, including public policies, but also including 
broader social and economic characteristics that vary by state. We sought to determine whether 
higher education systems with deregulated management structures out-performed their historical 
records or the nation on measures like enrollment, completion, tuition inflation, low-income student 
enrollment, and amount of family income needed for college. We report on that here, with the clear 
caveat that other factors matter much more than management structure. 
 
We compared trends on various measures tracking student enrollment and completion, affordability, 
and low-income student access across three categories of higher education management. Our 
categories build on the American Council on Education (ACE) categories but we simplify and 
regroup slightly because of changes since 2004. Our categories of higher education systems are:   
• “Highly deregulated” approaches with broad scale restructuring, weakened state control, and 
exemptions from statutes regulating administrative and fiscal procedure;  
• “Partially regulated” approaches with more limited reductions of control focused on internal 
matters and tuition setting but without the emphasis on fiscal and administrative procedures; 
and  
• “Coordinated” systems that re-conceptualize or re-commit to coordination across the higher 
education system.  
 
Our control group is the nation as a whole.  Figure 3 depicts the management categories. In each 
category, we include two or three states, chosen because: other analysts have considered them 
aggressive in their embrace of that approach; changes are system-wide instead of focused on single 
institutions, campuses, or graduate/ professional schools; and changes were passed prior to 2005, 
yielding enough time to track trends at least five years past the policy’s benchmark year.  
  
                                                
28 Couturier, p. 37. 
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Figure 3 
Categories of university approaches for analysis 
Highly deregulated 
• Values devolution of public authority and institutional 
control 
• Decentralizes the system, without defining 
coordination as a goal in the statute. 
• Provides the broadest exemption from state laws, 
including internal matters, personnel, procurement, 
construction, and real estate. 
• Attempts to provide accountability through 
performance targets. 
 
Types from ACE: Decentralization, vouchers, charter 
colleges 
States: Colorado, Virginia 
Policy change years: 2004, 2005 
Coordinated 
• Values systematic coordination of higher 
education where state universities are part of an 
integrated whole. 
• May involve broad exemption from state laws or 
more limited exemption from state law. 
• Establishes accountability through performance 
targets. 
 
 
 
Types from ACE: Public corporations, statewide 
compacts 
States: Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota 
Policy change years: 1997, 1999, 1995 
Partially regulated 
• Values restricted devolution; university control 
restricted to tuition price setting and internal matters. 
• Gives up public control over some aspects of 
universities 
• Exemption from state statutes on administrative and 
fiscal procedure not emphasized 
 
Types from ACE:  Decentralization, tuition deregulation 
States: Illinois, New Jersey, Texas 
Policy change years: 1995, 1994, 2003 
Control group: Nation 
• Averages all types of higher education 
approaches in the United States 
• Expresses the average performance on various 
higher education measures across all 50 states 
and the District of Columbia 
 
 
 
 
 
Our analysis compares long-term trends in these categories to national trends on measures of student 
affordability, access, enrollment and completion. Our aim is to consider higher education outcomes 
after policy change, as well as to make observations about the highly deregulated model, the category 
to which Ohio would belong if it passed the Enterprise University Plan. Appendix 1 further describes 
the methods and case selection underlying this analysis. 
 
Our analysis suggests that all deregulated approaches lag national averages in controlling tuition 
inflation and in providing access to low-income students. In some important categories the 
coordinated approach has seen success: in particular, coordinated systems have out-performed 
national averages in enrollment and completion, probably more because of level of state investment 
than because of management structure. Coordinated systems offer more state aid to Pell Grant 
recipients than the other three categories, and take a slightly lower share of low-income family 
earnings to support a student at a four-year institution. Institutions examined in this category had 
higher levels of public investment in the base year of 1990. Although such investment decreased as a 
share of personal income over twenty years, it remains higher in coordinated states than in the other 
three categories. Highly deregulated systems have in the last decade shown the worst performance in 
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tuition affordability. These systems have seen growing overall and low-income enrollment, but less 
student completion.  
 
Enrollment and bachelor’s degree completion 
Outcomes are at the heart of higher education policy: are more people able to come to college and to 
attain a degree? Those who do, gain enormous lifetime benefits in employment opportunities and 
earnings. Two trends are relevant: trends overall and trends among low-income students, the group 
that offers the largest growth potential in college participation (analyzed in next section). 
 
Over the period 1997-2008, enrollment overall grew in the nation and in all three higher education 
categories analyzed, although it is important to note that the highly deregulated schools underwent 
the change to that management structure only in 2004 and 2005. The highly deregulated and partially 
regulated categories had lower enrollment growth than the nation, both before and after the 
management structure changes. However, enrollment trends diverge across states within categories, 
suggesting no simple connection between enrollment rates and higher education structure. This is to 
be expected. Enrollment in college ebbs and flows with regional macroeconomic trends (i.e. 
unemployment rates, mass changes in industries), the changing demographic make-up of states, and 
other public policies; management structure would not trump these more fundamental things. The one 
state where enrollment rates were impacted (negatively) by changes in higher education policy was 
Colorado, where faulty implementation of a 2004 tuition voucher resulted in a sharp decline in 
community college enrollment that depressed enrollment overall.29 
 
The trends on college completion are depicted in Figure 4. Graduation rates don't differ significantly 
by management model but are best in the highly deregulated systems, with some caveats. Graduation 
rates started out slightly higher in the highly deregulated systems when these systems were still under 
a more traditional management structure. Since then, rates in those systems (58.3 percent) converged 
somewhat with rates in the coordinated systems (57.4 percent). Essentially all management systems 
fail to graduate between one-third and one half of the students who enroll. Ohio’s six-year graduation 
rate among students seeking a bachelor’s degree lags the nation, as the gray line shows.  
 
  
                                                
29 Western Interstate Commission on Higher Education, An Evaluation of Colorado’s College Opportunity Fund and 
Related Policies, May 2009. Colorado has since improved its rates of student enrollment. 
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Figure 5 shows that enrollment has grown substantially across all management structures both 
between 2000 and 2004 and between 2004 and 2008. Growth was generally stronger over the earlier 
period, and of the four management structures, partially deregulated systems had the strongest overall 
growth, 19.3 percent over the combined eight-year period. 
 
Note that the highly deregulated systems changed to that management structure in 2004 and 2005, so 
only the green bar is relevant to assessing how that management structure correlated with that 
outcome.  During that time, enrollment growth in highly deregulated systems lagged the nation and 
the other two management structures examined here.  As a result, enrollment grew the most slowly 
within the most highly deregulated category over the decade. Ohio’s enrollment growth also lagged 
national averages over the whole decade, but was stronger in the second half of the period.  
 
  
Figure 4 
Regardless of management structure, many who start don’t finish 
Student six-year bachelor’s completion, 1997-2009	  	  
	  
Source: Policy Matters Ohio, based on National Higher Education Management Information Center (NCHEMS). 
Note that CO and VA, the two systems in the highly deregulated category, only switched to that structure in 2004 
and 2005 respectively, so the light circles represent the more relevant data points to look at for those systems, as 
opposed to the black circles. 
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Figure 6 shows that across all management structures, graduation rates failed to keep pace with 
enrollment rates shown in Figure 5 above. We left the scale the same so that readers could see how 
much lower 6-year bachelor’s degree completion growth was than enrollment over the periods. 
Nonetheless, completion did grow slightly over all management structures, with by far the strongest 
performance coming from the coordinated management systems. Because the highly deregulated 
systems were deregulated in 2004 and 2005, the blue part of the bar is less relevant for assessing this 
management approach and performance after deregulation lagged the earlier period.  Ohio showed 
much stronger growth in completion than the deregulated or partially regulated systems and than the 
nation in both time periods.  
 
While this paper has largely focused on outcomes under different management structures, it is worth 
noting that all public university systems are doing a poor job of helping enrollees complete their 
studies and emerge with a bachelor’s degree. Enrollment grew substantially over the eight-year 
period but completion grew much more slowly. All public university systems need to determine how 
to better assist their students in successfully completing bachelor’s degree programs. 
  
Figure 5 
Enrollment grows substantially across all management structures 
Percent change in enrollment, 2000-2004 and 2004-2008  
 
Source: Southern Regional Education Board, Table 35, “Total Enrollment in Public Four-Year Institutions of Higher 
Education.”  Note that the highly deregulated systems were deregulated in 2004 and 2005, making the blue (light) 
part of the bar less relevant for assessing that management model. Blue (light) and green (darker) portions cannot 
be added together to get overall growth. See Figure 7 for overall growth rates over the two consequent periods. 
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There are many differences among these states and little reason to think that higher education 
management structure is the key variable. However, it is clear that deregulating higher education does 
not dramatically solve problems in enrollment and completion. Researchers should continue to 
explore whether certain properties of coordinated higher education systems have a hand in facilitating 
the better record on graduation. These systems might have more focused institutional missions, more 
consistent core curricula and degree requirements across campuses, or better ability to facilitate 
transfer between two-year and four-year institutions.30 
 
Access for tomorrow’s middle class 
Governor Kasich, like many Ohio governors before him, has said that substantial growth in the 
number of college graduates is a top priority.31 Yet, as illustrated in Figure 1, success in access and 
attainment is highly correlated with family income. Students of middle and low-income families are 
much less likely to enroll in college than their wealthier peers. They graduate at lower rates, too, 
                                                
30 The National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education found that, nationally, students transferring from 
community colleges to four-year colleges or universities are 15% less likely to graduate than students beginning their 
studies at a four-year institution. See the National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education, “Affordability and 
Transfer: Critical to Increasing Baccalaureate Degree Completion,” Policy Alert, June 2011. 
31 An Enterprise University Plan for Ohio, op.cit., states in the second paragraph on the first page: “Today many of our 
students never complete their studies and those who do often take too long to earn their degree and are saddled with too 
much debt;” see also, Karen Farkas, “Improving Graduation Rates at Ohio’s Public Universities a Priority for Governor 
John Kasich, Chancellor Jim Petro,” Plain Dealer, January 20, 2012 at http://bit.ly/XebYDJ.  
Figure 6 
Graduation doesn’t keep pace with enrollment growth 
Percent change in six-year bachelor’s completion, 2000-2004 and 2004-2008 
 Source: National Center for Higher Education Management Systems, Six-Year Graduation Rates of Bachelor’s 
Students. Note that the highly deregulated systems were deregulated in 2004 and 2005 so the blue (light) portion of 
that bar is less relevant for assessing that management structure. Blue (light) and green (darker) portions cannot 
be added together to get overall growth rate over the full period. See Figure 7 for growth over full period. 
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because of high costs, financial struggles, and the preparation received from under-resourced 
schools.32  
 
At the same time, the evidence in Figure 8 shows that, nationally, low-income students are eager to 
enter college. Over the past 40 years, growth in enrollment has been strongest in the bottom two 
income quartiles, and the growth in the lowest income quartile has accelerated sharply in the past five 
years. As Figure 6 highlights, low-income students have the most potential for increasing higher 
education levels. 
 
 
States have different capacities for incorporating low-income students in public colleges and 
universities. Low-income student enrollment, as measured by the percentage of Pell Grant recipients 
among undergraduates, has been growing. In the nation, 37.8 percent of undergraduates at public 
four-year institutions were Pell Grant recipients in 2009-10. In each of the more deregulated 
university categories, Pell Grant recipients made up a slightly to substantially lower share of 
undergraduates: 35.4 percent in the partially regulated group, 31.5 percent in coordinated group, and 
26.1 percent in the highly deregulated group.33 All deregulated groups lagged the national average, 
but the systems characterized by a high degree of deregulation lagged by 31 percent, almost a full 
                                                
32 Lana Manaskin, John Lee, Abigail Wilner, and Watson Scott Swail, Raising the Graduation Rates of Low-Income 
College Students, The Pell Institute, December 2004. 
33 Postsecondary Education Opportunity, State Reports, Table 16, Pell Grant Recipients as a Percentage of Pell-Eligible 
Undergraduate Enrollment by Institutional Type/Control. 
Figure 7 
Increase in college participation rates by family income quartile for 
dependent 18 to 24-year-olds since 1970 , U.S. 
 
 
 
Source:  Source:  Policy Matters Ohio, based on Postsecondary Education Opportunity, “Family Income and 
Educational Attainment, 1970 to 2010,” Newsletter #235, January 2012 at http://bit.ly/R41PXE. 
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third below, and the highly deregulated systems have worsened, comparatively, since the 
deregulation took place.  
 
When the economy is weaker, more families become eligible for assistance, so the percentage of 
students eligible for Pell grants has climbed in every management structure since the 2007 recession. 
Figure 9 illustrates the trends for low-income student enrollment between 1995-96 and 2009-10 
across the four categories, with the caveat that the changes to the highly deregulated systems – 
designated by markers in the data series - were only in the latter years of this analysis. More Ohio 
students need – and get – Pell grants than in any of the other management systems on average, 
illustrating the importance of this federal aid to increasing Ohio college participation and completion 
rates. 
 
Figure 8 
More Ohio students need, and get, federal help 
Pell grant recipients as a percent of total undergraduate enrollment 
Public four-year institutions  
 
Source: Postsecondary Education Opportunity, State Reports, Table 16, Pell Grant Recipients as a 
Percentage of Pell-Eligible Undergraduate Enrollment by Institutional Type/Control.  Note that CO and VA, the 
two systems in the highly deregulated category, only switched to that structure in 2004 and 2005 respectively, 
so the light circles represent the more relevant data points to look at for those systems, as opposed to the 
black circles.  
Within the highly deregulated category, Colorado saw a 1.4 percent decline and Virginia a 2.3 
percent decline of low-income student share, compared to a 1.5 percent decline nationally. The 
timing of this larger decline in Virginia may suggest some relationship to the 2005 Act to restructure 
higher education and associated tuition hikes and cuts in state support to higher education (discussed 
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in next section). Ohio had a slightly higher share of Pell Grant Recipients attending public, four-year 
institutions than the nation throughout the decade, but a much higher share than in some of the 
deregulated states. 
 
There was similar solid growth in low-income student enrollment in all four categories between 
2007-08 and 2009-10, ranging between 5.3 and 6.0 percentage points, as mentioned in part 
unemployment has been high making more families eligible for aid. This is an opportunity for states 
to sustain the momentum and try to ensure successful college completions among low-income 
students.  
 
 
 
Tuition affordability in a period of dwindling state funding 
Student demand for postsecondary education is growing at a time of decreasing state fiscal support. 
The U.S. as a whole is disinvesting in higher education, as illustrated by Figure 8. In 1991, the higher 
education categories we analyze were allocating to higher education a low of $7.55 and a high of 
$9.48 per $1,000 of state personal income. Ohio was allocating less than the national average in 
1991: $7.03 per $1,000 in personal income.   
 
In 2011, states were allocating far less. The highly deregulated systems were allocating a paltry $3.79 
per 1,000 of state personal income to higher education. The sharp decline and the extremely low level 
of support is fairly shocking given the importance of higher education to future well-being.  Ohio 
allocated $4.57 per $1,000 in personal income in 2011, more than the highly deregulated states but 
significantly less than the national average (21 percent less). 
 
Higher education funding declined in all categories, by half in the highly deregulated systems (49.8 
percent), and by about a third in the others (33.2 in the partially deregulated category; 31.6 percent in 
the coordinated category and 31 percent in the nation.)  In Ohio, it fell by 35 percent between 1991 
and 2011: a similar decline from a lower baseline. 
 
Erosion of need-based aid 
The federal Pell Grant program is the main vehicle for providing need-based financial aid 
in the 50 states. In 1986, Congress capped Pell grants at 60 percent of the cost of attending 
school at public universities or colleges. Since then, the grant’s value has fallen to 44 
percent in 1991, and to 32 percent today. Pell’s erosion has hurt low-income students in 
Ohio, especially since the state has also slashed its grant programs for low-income 
students. While Ohio’s need-based aid continues to supplement Pell, it now covers only 
18.9 percent of Pell-eligible students, far less than the 46.5 percent it covered in 1990, and 
far less than the national average. The dollar amount of Ohio’s need-based grants relative 
to Pell has also declined; today, the average grant from the state of Ohio is only 6 percent 
of the average Pell award; this is 72 percent lower than the national average of need-based 
state aid awards.  
 
Post Secondary Education Opportunity and Quinterno, John, Demos. The Great Cost Shift: How Higher 
Education Cuts Undermine the Future Middle Class, March 2012. http://bit.ly/QhraNI.  
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Of all the categories, the coordinated category invests the greatest dollar amount in higher education 
funding, and the highly deregulated category by far the least. As mentioned, it is this difference in 
financial support that is likely at the root of the greater success of coordinated systems and the 
weaker performance of highly deregulated systems in terms of skyrocketing tuition and in terms of 
growth in student completion. 
 
Declining state fiscal support leaves universities with budget shortfalls most readily filled by tuition. 
As tuition rises, college-bound students turn to private savings, jobs, or loans to cover the rising cost. 
This can leave students in debt and can make it difficult to finish school, especially given the long-
term decline in the value of the minimum wage. The economists Steven Hemelt and Dave Marcotte 
find that with every $100 increase in tuition price, even in an era of the easy loan, 27 students are 
discouraged from enrolling in college.34 
 
The high and growing cost of college tuition is a nationally recognized problem. Since 2000 tuition has 
skyrocketed across all management structures and from flagship universities to community colleges, as 
Figure 9 shows. Across most of the categories analyzed in this report, tuition increase has been more 
pronounced at flagship and state universities or colleges and more restrained at community colleges.35  
.7 percent at flagship universities, 58.7 percent at state colleges or universities, and  
Figure 9 
Decline in state fiscal support for higher education per $1,000 in state 
personal income, 1991 and 2011 
	  
	  
Source: National Center for Higher Education Management Systems Information Center (NCHEMS), State and 
Local Support for Higher Education Operating Expenses Per $1,000 of Personal Income, 1991 and 2011, 
retrieved at  http://www.higheredinfo.org/dbrowser/index.php?measure=49. 
 
Across the less-regulated higher education systems, tuition at four-year institutions has grown to a 
staggering degree and increases have accelerated over the two decades examined. In inflation-
adjusted dollars, tuition increased the most sharply – by nearly 90 percent – in highly deregulated 
                                                
34 Steven Hemelt and Dave Marcotte, “Rising Tuition and Enrollment in Public Higher Education,” Institute for the Study 
of Labor, Bonn, Germany, November 2008, p. 13. 
35  The exception is the Coordinated category where the inverse holds. This is mostly due to the impact of Kentucky, a 
state with incredibly high tuition increases across all institutional types including community colleges. 
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flagship schools, in partially regulated flagships (82.7 percent), and in partially regulated four-year 
state schools (84 percent), in just ten years, between 2000 and 2009.  
 
The relationship between management structures and tuition increases is complicated. In states like 
Virginia and Texas, restructuring policies have been motivated partly by the desire to allow 
universities to increase tuition. They have done so. The deregulation of the highly deregulated 
systems took place in 2004 and 2005; over that short time the tuition increases were steep. Still the 
highest tuition is in the partially regulated flagship schools and state schools.  
 
Table 1 
Skyrocketing tuition 
Tuition and fee growth by management structure, adjusted for inflation 
Category/ 
institutional type 
1990 
tuition 
1999 
tuition 
Increase 
1990-99 
2000 
tuition 
2009 
tuition 
Increase 
2000-09 
Highly deregulated 
Flagship $4,125  $5,202  26.1% $4,667  $8,818  89.0% 
State $3,380  $4,197  45.9% $3,838  $6,067  58.1% 
Community $1,530  $2,181  42.6% $1,972  $2,872  45.6% 
Average $3,102  $3,860  24.4% $3,492  $5,919  69.5% 
Partially regulated 
Flagship $4,077  $6,208  52.3% $6,092  $11,129  82.7% 
State $3,210  $4,684  45.9% $4,856  $8,941  84.1% 
Community $1,493  $2,036  36.3% $2,042  $2,739  34.1% 
Average $2,927  $4,309  47.2% $4,330  $7,603  75.6% 
Coordinated 
Flagship $3,566  $5,404  51.5% $5,530  $9,192  66.2% 
State $2,922  $4,167  42.6% $4,308  $6,808  58.1% 
Community $1,791  $2,455  37.1% $2,488  $3,919  57.5% 
Average $2,760  $4,009  45.3% $4,109  $6,640  61.6% 
Nation 
Flagship $3,405  $4,856  42.6% $4,905  $7,693  56.8% 
State $2,766  $3,839  38.8% $3,895  $6,257  60.6% 
Community $1,531  $2,084  36.1% $2,109  $3,029  43.6% 
Average $2,567  $3,593  40.0% $3,636  $5,660  55.6% 
Source: Policy Matters Ohio based on Postsecondary Education Opportunity, State Reports, Table 22, 
Tuition and Fees in Public Institutions by State and Year. 
.8 percent at community colleges in the United States, in constant 
Ohio’s tuition is high relative to the nation but tuition freezes and caps have moderated growth in the 
present decade compared to states with deregulated management systems. Ohio has done better than 
the nation in checking tuition inflation in recent years.  Nonetheless, tuition here increased by 50 
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percent during a decade that the state median wage dropped by $1.33 per hour, the second largest 
decline in the nation.36 Tuition at our flagship campuses is lower than in all of the less regulated 
systems, but at our other state four-year universities it is higher than in most other management 
structures. It is also extremely high when considering our modest family incomes – Ohio is tied with 
Michigan for third after Pennsylvania and Maine in cost of tuition as a percent of median family 
income, as Figure 10 shows.37 This is not sustainable for Ohio students and families.   
 
 
High tuition inflation is a problem in all American universities, and worse in the less regulated higher 
education systems included in this report. This astronomical tuition inflation coincides with the steep  
dip in state commitments to higher education funding, especially 
in highly deregulated states. This raises questions about the 
assumptions underlying deregulation – that it will rein in costs 
and curb tuition inflation. 
 
Making college affordable through  
need-based aid 
High tuition makes it hard for students to finish college, 
especially for students trying to enter or stay in the middle class. 
The recent trends in higher education funding make it even 
harder, not only because of cuts and corresponding tuition hikes 
but because of need-based financial aid is unreliable and hasn’t 
kept up with tuition growth. While low-income student 
participation in public colleges and universities has been 
growing, federal and state policies have cut need-based financial 
aid since 2000, after a brief spike. Obviously the main factor 
affecting need-based aid is how much need-based aid the state 
legislature provides or mandates, not the management structure. 
Figure 11 shows the trends around state-provided need-based aid 
since 1990.  
 
Today, fewer low-income (Pell eligible) students receive state grants to complement federal 
assistance than students did in 2000, despite rising costs. Institutions in the coordinated systems 
provide the most need-based grant coverage – about 45 percent of students who are eligible for 
                                                
36 Amy Hanauer, State of Working Ohio 2012, Policy Matters Ohio, September 2012 at http://bit.ly/XelSoQ.  
37 http://www.higheredinfo.org/dbrowser/index.php?submeasure=75&year=2009&level=nation&mode=data&state=0 
Table 2 
Ohio tuition grows sharply, not as fast-growing as in deregulated schools 
 1990 1999 Increase 2000 2010 Increase 
Flagship $3,789 $5,105 34.7% $5,293 $8,706 64.5% 
State $4,066 $5,490 35.0% $5,661 $8,387 48.2% 
Community $2,441 $2,692 10.3% $2,633 $3,440 30.6% 
Source: Policy Matters Ohio based on Postsecondary Education Opportunity, State Reports, Table 22, Tuition and 
Fees in Public Institutions by State and Year. 
Figure 10 
Most expensive public 
university systems, as 
percent of median income 
1. Pennsylvania 
2. Maine 
3. Ohio (tied with MI) 
4. Michigan (tied with OH) 
5. Illinois 
6. Delaware 
7. New Hampshire 
8. Oregon 
9. Vermont 
10. Rhode Island 
 Source: NCHEMS, Percent of Median Family 
Income Needed to Pay for College, Public 4-
year Colleges/Universities. 
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federal Pell Grants also get state help in coordinated systems, compared to just 28 percent of such 
students in the nation as a whole.  
 
Figure 11 
Only some who need state aid get it 
Percent of low-income students getting state aid 
 
Source: Postsecondary Education Opportunity, State Reports, Table 17, Need-Based Grant Coverage of Pell Grant 
Recipients:  This shows the share of Pell grant students receiving supplementary state need-based aid.  Note that 
CO and VA, the two systems in the highly deregulated category, only switched to that structure in 2004 and 2005 
respectively, so the light circles (2005 and 2009) represent the more relevant data points to look at for those 
systems, as opposed to the black circles – the 2005 data point is barely visible behind that of the nation. 
 
The colleges and universities in highly deregulated systems come in a close second on this measure, 
providing help to 42.4 percent of Pell-eligible students, with much of the growth in need-based aid 
due to changes in Colorado.38 Two caveats are relevant – these systems have the highest tuition and 
highest tuition growth, necessitating aid for low-income students who attend. They also have the 
lowest percentage of low-income students, so can afford to give aid to more of them. Performance 
targeting may also play a role, in that universities are responding to goals established by legislators as 
part of the deregulation process. The biggest factor affecting aid is not the management structure but 
the state requirements and assistance. 
 
Ohio provided need-based aid to more eligible students in the year 2000, helping nearly 83 percent of 
those who needed assistance. Unfortunately, that portion has plunged, and in the most recent year for 
which we have data we were helping fewer than 20 percent of the students eligible for Pell grants. 
Ohio’s dollar amount of state need-based aid has fallen steeply since 2005. Whereas once the state 
                                                
38 The higher coverage of need-based aid did not translate into a higher proportion of Pell grant undergraduate enrollment 
for the highly deregulated category (See Figure 9). Most likely, this is due to implementation flaws associated with the 
rollout of the College Opportunity Fund (COF) that discouraged community college students from enrolling in the two 
years following policy changes. 
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provided far more need-based aid than the average state (as one would expect, given that we are the 
seventh largest state), Ohio now provides less need-based aid than the average state, despite our 
relatively large size (Figure 12).   
 
Figure 12 
Funding for need-based financial aid 
Ohio and national average, in millions of dollars 
 
Source: Southern Regional Education Board, State Scholarships, Grants, and Other Financial Aid 
Funds, Need-Based Grants. Not adjusted for inflation. 
 
The combination of cuts to instructional aid, steep tuition increases, and stagnant and inconsistent 
need-based financial aid go against the goal of affordability, for obvious reasons. Tuition hikes affect 
all students, but of course they affect low- and moderate-income students more. The share of bottom 
quintile family income needed for four-year college is staggering, as revealed in Table 3. Long-term 
data are unavailable, but between 2007 and 2009, across all groups, college costs increased as a share 
of low-income family income. Low-income families would have to spend between 45 and 69 percent 
of their entire family income to send one child to a four-year institution, including room and board, 
an insurmountable hurdle for many and in Ohio, it’s even worse – Table 3 shows that Ohio is an 
outlier, requiring a whopping 77.1 percent of family income to send a student to a four-year state 
university. It is no wonder that too few poor kids can complete college.  
 
As discussed above, we’re also slashing need-based aid. The three factors together – our high price 
for four-year state schools, our relatively low state income, and our plunging support to need based 
aid – add up to a formula that keeps many moderate and low-income students from getting higher 
education in Ohio. 
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Low- and moderate-income students are an important part of the future of higher education. 
Neglecting affordability runs contrary to our interest in broadening higher educational attainment. 
Researchers from the University of Michigan found that the imbalance between rich and poor 
students in college completion has grown by about 50 percent since the 1980s.39 We have to make 
college more affordable if low and moderate-income students are to gain the credentials needed for 
middle-class jobs that make regions strong. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Ohio’s governor and chancellor have presented a deregulated approach to university management. 
Given the track record of deregulation in other states, we have little reason to think that this approach 
will make tuition more affordable, increase access for low- and moderate-income students, or 
increase graduation rates. The primary factor affecting access and affordability is state support for 
higher education and state targeting of support for low- and moderate-income families. New 
management models are unlikely to bring about those goals. We found: 
• Deregulated higher education systems have higher tuition and more tuition inflation than the 
nation, and the problem is the worst in Virginia and Colorado, states with the highest degree 
of deregulation. The tuition burden on low-income families is high almost everywhere and 
even worse in less regulated systems. 
• Enrollment overall continues to grow in the nation and in states with deregulated systems. 
• Enrollment among low-income students has risen in states with deregulated systems, but 
remains lower than in the nation as a whole. If we want more low-income enrollment, we 
need to provide funding and require universities to address this issue. 
• Completion rates are rising but not as quickly as enrollment. States with coordinated systems 
have higher rates of improvement in college completion than other models, including the 
control group (national average). This likely has more to do with funding trends than with 
management structures, but we suggest further research to understand the coordinated 
systems’ success in these areas. 
                                                
39 Martha Bailey and Susan Dynarski, Gains and Gaps: Changing Inequality in U.S. College Entry and Completion, 
NBER Working Paper No. 17633, December 2011. 
Table 3 
Can you spend more than half a year’s pay for college? 
Share of bottom quintile family income needed for net tuition, room, and board  
at four-year public colleges and universities 
 2007 2009 Growth 
Highly deregulated 49.3% 57.5% 16.8% 
Partially deregulated 60.1% 69.0% 14.7% 
Coordinated 51.4% 55.0% 7.0% 
Nation 54.2% 60.7% 12.0% 
Ohio 76.8% 77.1% 0.4% 
Source: National Center for Higher Education Management Systems, Percent of Family Income Needed to Pay for College By Type of 
Institution, Percent of Net Family Income from Lowest Quintile, 4-Year Public Universities, not adjusted for inflation. 
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Experiences in other states can help Ohio lawmakers and citizens decide how best to proceed on 
higher education. Ohio has lower than average higher education attainment, high tuition, a gutted 
system of need-based financial aid, and lower than average enrollment growth. Six-year graduation 
rates among students studying for their bachelor’s degree lag the nation.  We also boast some 
strengths, including a relatively high proportion of low-income students enrolled in public colleges 
and universities and a slightly higher growth in college completion rates than the nation over the past 
decade (although growth slowed precipitously in the second half). A 3.5 percent tuition cap is in 
place that helps control tuition inflation. 
 
Reducing public control of Ohio’s higher education system through deregulation, decentralization, 
and privatization is not the best policy option for solving our higher education problems. More 
promising alternatives include: 
 
1. Adequate funding of higher education. Public colleges and universities are unable to 
contain college costs alone. Ohio could commit to higher education funding at least to the 
same level as the average state. States that invest more in higher education have more 
graduates and higher wages. 
2. Commit to need-based aid. Shockingly, Ohio’s need-based aid is at the same dollar amount 
as in 1993, not adjusted for inflation. When low-income students want to attend college, our 
high tuition makes it difficult. Some states, like Virginia, accompanied deregulation with 
increases in commitment to need-based aid. If Ohio wants to increase its college attainment 
levels, it is essential that we commit to helping low-income students afford tuition.  
3. Coordination. Coordinated systems have better student completion than the nation as a whole 
and higher rates of improvement in this area over the past decade. Through things like 
differentiated missions, consistent degree standards, and easy transfer policies, it appears that 
coordinated university systems are able to support students in ways that facilitate student 
success. Ohio should explore what makes these systems work and consider the implications 
for our system. 
4. Performance targets. Performance targets, not surprisingly, lead to better outcomes. Ohio is 
considered a leader in performance funding, a related concept.40 Performance targets in states 
like Maryland, Virginia, and Colorado are meant to enroll low-income students, address lack 
of affordability of higher education, and ensure better labor practices. These targets or 
requirements should be part of all higher education management systems. 
 
The Enterprise University Plan for Ohio proposed deep changes for higher education that lost sight 
of low- and moderate-income students in a way that is out of step with Ohio’s own goals, labor force 
needs, and understanding of higher education as a pathway to the middle class. Ohio’s future depends 
on an excellent higher education system capable of preparing Ohioans to participate in the economy 
and community. It is essential that Ohio citizens maintain control over Ohio’s higher education 
institutions.  
                                                
40 Matthew Crellin, Darrell Aaron, David Mabe, and Courtney Wilk. Catalyst for Completion: Performance-Based 
Funding in Higher Education, a case study of three states. New England Board of Higher Education, March 2011. 
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APPENDIX 1 
This paper evaluated the possible impacts of deregulating higher education in Ohio. We considered 
three levels of deregulation and examined how states that have embraced those approaches have done 
in terms of student enrollment and completion, affordability, and low-income student access.  
 
The category scheme 
The categories used in this report build on the American Council on Education’s (ACE) 2004 report 
“Shifting Ground: Accountability, Autonomy, and Privatization in Higher Education.” The ACE 
documented six types of policy changes developed by states that were privatizing or deregulating 
higher education management. The ACE described these as fuzzy categories with overlap. Building 
from the ACE categories, we define three overarching categories of higher education deregulation, 
compared to the nation as a whole: 
 
Highly deregulated – Reduces public control to the highest degree. Gives over public control 
to university administrators on many internal decisions. Exempts universities from statutory 
administrative and fiscal procedure concerning personnel, procurement, construction, and real 
estate. 
 
Partially regulated – Reduces public control, retains accountability measures, gives 
university administrators control over some internal matters including tuition, retains state 
authority over some administrative and fiscal procedures. 
 
Coordinated – Reduces public control to some degree but provides more substantial 
accountability measures. Exempts universities from some mandates. Typically retains more 
public support and control over universities than other deregulation models. 
 
Nation – Represents the average public college or university in the United States. 
 
In our report, we included two or three states in each category, chosen because: (1) they are identified 
by other analysts or in Chancellor Petro’s Enterprise University Plan as a significant example of 
deregulated higher education models, (2) changes are large-scale, involving major university systems 
rather than minor campuses or specialty schools focused on graduate or technical education, and (3) 
they enacted changes no later than 2005, giving us trends of at least five years after the policy passed. 
The reader should note that this excludes Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin, and other states with 
recent major higher education policy changes, as well as states like Connecticut whose changes were 
concentrated at a single institution.  
 
We focused on the years 1990-2010 to capture the relevant period. For some measures, data was 
unavailable as far back as 1990. The rationale for placing states in each category is described as 
follows: 
 
Highly deregulated 
Colorado. The College Opportunity Fund Act (COF) established the nation’s only postsecondary 
tuition voucher system. The state’s motivation for creating COF in 2004 was to reclassify 
postsecondary institutions as “enterprises” under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR), thereby 
exempting them from statutory limits on spending increases. Numerous experts consider the 
development of COF as one of the most aggressive reorganizations of higher education in the United 
States. This is the basis for categorizing Colorado as a highly deregulated state, although it was not 
until 2010 that additional statute exemptions in the areas of procurement, construction, personnel 
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policy, and real estate were instituted. See Kelly Fox, “Vouchers in Public Higher Education: The 
Colorado Approach to Funding and Access,” Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 
August 2006. Additionally, Chancellor Petro’s Enterprise University Plan identifies Colorado, along 
with Virginia, as a leading precedent for his proposal. 
 
Virginia. Higher education expert Lara Couturier described the 2005 Higher Education Restructuring 
Act as an unprecedented effort to establish institutional autonomy and decentralization in higher 
education management, including exemption from a broad range of statutes. This is the basis for 
categorizing it as a highly deregulated state. See Lara Couturier, “Checks and Balances at Work: The 
Restructuring of Virginia’s Public Higher Education System,” The National Center for Public Policy 
and Higher Education, June 2006. Chancellor Petro’s Enterprise University Plan, along with 
Colorado, identifies Virginia as a prime example and justification for policy change in Ohio. 
 
Partially regulated 
Illinois. In 1995, S.B. 614 decentralized higher education in Illinois, eliminating the “system of 
systems” and creating local governing boards for seven of twelve postsecondary institutions. This 
also ceded some public control in the areas of internal governance, lobbying, programming, and 
internal matters but typically not fiscal and administrative procedure. This narrower concept of 
reduced public control is why Illinois is part of the partially regulated category. See Richard 
Richardson, “State Structures for the Governance of Higher Education: Illinois Case Study 
Summary,” California Higher Education Policy Center, Spring 1997. 
 
New Jersey.  The Higher Education Restructuring Act of 1994 created a decentralized university 
governance structure that reduced public control, especially in internal matters like academic 
programming, hiring and promotions, and budgeting. Tuition deregulation and exemption from 
mandates regulating personnel, procurement, construction, and real estate were not part of the 
change. This more restrained deregulation is the basis for placement in the partially regulated 
category. See Laurence Marcus and Cynthia Hickman, “The Outcomes of New Jersey’s Higher 
Education Restructuring Act of 1994,” Association for the Study of Higher Education, May 8, 1998. 
 
Texas. HB 3015 amended the Texas code to allow universities to set tuition price, with some 
required set-asides for financial aid. Because reduced public control was limited to tuition, Texas is 
placed in the partially regulated category. See Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 
“Overview: Tuition Deregulation,” April 2010. 
 
Coordinated 
Kentucky. The Postsecondary Education Improvement Act was passed in 1997 and Section 2, (2) (f) 
commits the higher education system to, among other goals, “an efficient, responsive, and 
coordinated system of autonomous institutions that delivers educational services to its citizens in 
quantities and of a quality that is comparable to the national average.”  Coordination was arranged 
through a new university system to enforce policies and monitor university performance. Kentucky’s 
stronger framework for coordination is the basis for placing Kentucky in the coordinated category. 
See Rodney Cain, “Kentucky Education Improvement Act Deserves Support,” Business Courier, 
May 12, 1997. 
 
Maryland. The University System of Maryland (USM) was created as a public corporation. The Act 
made the USM a corporation with the same powers afforded any other corporation to transact 
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business, enter into contracts, form partnerships, incur liabilities, invest surplus resources, control real 
estate, issue bonds, and enter other transactions. Moreover, USM’s authority cannot be superceded by 
“constituent institutions or centers” or state agencies or offices. USM’s powers can be limited only if 
statutes are passed to override the 1999 law. That Maryland made the public corporation at the 
system level rather than institutional level is the basis for placing Maryland in the coordinated 
category. See Board of Regents, “I-7.01 Policy and the Role of the University System of Maryland as 
a Public Corporation,” December 2, 2011. 
 
Minnesota. In 1991, the Minnesota State Colleges and Universities System (MnSCU) was created, a 
merger of all of the state’s state universities, community colleges, and technical colleges. The 
University of Minnesota system was excluded as the state constitution granted the University of 
Minnesota constitutional authority in 1851. The MnSCU enhanced the coordination of postsecondary 
education, especially around credit transfer, academic programs, campus consolidation, and budget 
requests. See Office of the Legislative Auditor, State of Minnesota, “Program Evaluation Report #00-
07: The MnSCU Merger,” State of Minnesota, August 2000. For this reason, Minnesota was placed 
in the coordinated category, even though the Minnesota Higher Education Services Office described 
the 1991 change (took effect 1995) dismantling the Higher Education Services Office as 
decentralization. See Minnesota Higher Education Services Office, “Overview of Minnesota 
Postsecondary Education,” Prepared for Citizens League of Higher Education, May 21, 2004. 
 
We compiled descriptive statistics on measures of enrollment, completion, and affordability for each 
state, using governmental and nongovernmental sources. We then computed averages for each higher 
education management category, and the report tracks trends by category (whether highly 
deregulated, partially regulated, coordinated, or nation) rather than by state. For each group, we track 
and analyze trends on the measure three years, five years and, when applicable, ten years past the 
benchmark year. Ten-year data is unavailable for states with benchmark years later than 2000. This is 
the reason ten-year data is reported only for some categories. By tracking and recording trends over 
time, we were able to describe the performance for each category and offer some observations about 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of different approaches  
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